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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KLEIN & STEIN, Attorneys at Law, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
PETER J. ARNOLD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 93-0022 
92-11615 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Defendant/Appellant Peter J. Arnold, by counsel and pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, submits the following Reply Brief in support of the instant appeal. 
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff/appellee's brief offers its own statement of facts in opposition to 
defendant/appellant's appeal (see opposing brief at pp. 4-9). As set out below, many of these 
factual claims were directly contested by counter affidavits before the lower Court; accordingly, 
the entry of an order denying defendant/appellant's motion for relief from judgment without an 
evidentiary proceeding was manifest error. 
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1. Defendant/appellant vigorously disputes Paragraph 3 (and Paragraphs 8-9 of 
Mr. Klein's affidavit, cited in support thereof). Defendant/appellant retained plaintiff/appellee 
to prepare documents in connection with a real estate acquisition which, in defendant/appellant's 
experience as real estate developer, should not have taken more than a fraction of the time which 
Mr. Klein claims to have spent on the project. Plaintiff/appellee's billing statement (Exhibit 1 
hereto, R.0159) offers no detail as to why preparation of the documents required forty-two hours 
of a name partners time, billed at $185.00 per hour. In repeated telephone conversations with 
Michael Klein, defendant made clear that the bill was excessive in his opinion, and challenged 
the amount of time actually spent on the project. Affidavit of Peter J. Arnold, Exhibit 2 hereto 
(R. 0161), at 11 2-6. 
2. At paragraph 2, (based on Paragraphs 11-13 of Mr. Klein's affidavit), 
plaintiff/appellee makes reference to defendant/appellant's promises to pay its bill. Any such 
promises were occasioned by the fact that, at the time, defendant/appellant was completely 
insolvent, dealing with a number of creditors, and in no position to mount a legal challenge to 
the amount of plaintiffs bill. This is evidenced by the fact that, being unable to satisfy all or 
any portion of the bill, defendant was forced to submit to the entry of default judgment against 
him. Arnold Affidavit (Exhibit 2, R. 0161) at 11 6-7. 
3. In response to Paragraphs 5 and 6, defendant/appellant refers the court to its 
opening brief. No representations contrary to those set out in the correspondence attached to 
the opening memorandum were ever made to Mr. Klein. 
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4. Responding to paragraph 7, defendant/appellant encourages the court to review 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the May 18, 1992 letter-rather than Mr. Klein's 
self-serving, after-the-fact declarations concerning his unexpressed intentions in writing it—in 
determining whether or not it constituted a valid offer of settlement. It should be borne in mind 
that (as plaintiff/appellee implicitly admits) the settlement figure of $7,500.00 had already been 
raised by plaintiff/appellee during the telephone conversation between Mr. Klein and 
Mr. Rampton. 
5. In response to paragraph 8, the Court is again urged to review the 
correspondence submitted in connection with the affidavit of Vincent C. Rampton (Exhibit 3 to 
defendant/appellant's opening brief, R. 0032). No representations inconsistent therewith were 
made to any person. 
6. Mr. Klein apparently attempts to characterize his on-going contact with Arthur 
Greenburg, also defendant's counsel, as being merely an attempt to locate defendant or discover 
his whereabouts (Klein Affidavit at Paragraphs 14, 22-23). This is plainly intended to portray 
defendant/appellant as attempting to hide from plaintiff. In fact, from the first contact from the 
law office of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, plaintiff was well aware that defendant 
was residing in the State of Utah, and working through counsel in Salt Lake County in an 
attempt to resolve this matter. 
7. Contrary to the representations at 11 23-24 of Mr. Klein's affidavit, Arthur 
Greenburg never offered to "assist plaintiff and Mr. Klein in the collection of fees" from 
44691.1 3 
defendant; neither did Mr. Greenburg request any letter from plaintiff concerning any aspect of 
this matter. See Letter of Arthur Greenburg to Vincent C. Rampton, Exhibit 3 hereto 
(R. 0165). 
8. Plaintiff claims never to have received defendants letter of August 5, 1992, 
making the first of two tenders of $7,500.00 in full settlement of this matter (Klein Affidavit at 
Paragraph 30). Yet, plaintiff attempts to rely on the self-same letter for the proposition that 
defendant/appellant's counsel "retracted" the "damaging statements" made to Arthur Greenburg 
concerning Mr. Klein. 
9. Plaintiff/appellant admits, at 5 13, that at least by August 26, 1992, he had 
received formal tender of settlement in the amount of $7,500.00; plaintiff/appellee further 
implicitly admits that no objection thereto was ever communicated prior to the docketing of the 
California judgment in Summit County. 
10. Paragraph 15 of plaintiff/appellee's statement of facts plainly implies that its 
willingness to negotiate a settlement in this matter was motivated by lies concerning 
defendant/appellant's financial posture. Neither before the lower Court nor before this Court, 
however, has plaintiff/appellee produced a single shred of competent evidence to suggest that 
any misrepresentation occurred. In making its accusations, plaintiff/appellee jumps to the 
conclusion that (1) defendant was current on legal fees to both Mr. Greenburg and 
Mr. Rampton, and (2) that this was "inconsistent" with statements previously made by 
Mr. Rampton concerning defendant/appellant's overall financial posture. The court is referred 
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to the correspondence attached to defendant's opening memorandum; nothing inconsistent 
therewith was ever represented to plaintiff or any of its representatives. Respecting 
communications between Mr. Klein and Mr. Greenburg concerning the status of defendants fees 
to Greenburg, Glusker, Fields, Clamen and Machinger, see Exhibit 3 (R. 0165). 
11. The Court is referred to the text of Michael F. Klein's letter of June 22, 1992, 
concerning his claim that he had communicated a cessation of settlement negotiations thereby, 
and is invited to examine the letter in full-amid all the threats and representations contained 
therein, Mr. Klein nowhere expressly withdraws his $7,500.00 settlement offer. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE HAS FAILED TO JUSTIFY HIS FAILURE TO 
ACT ON DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S TENDER OF $7,500.00 IN 
SETTLEMENT OF THIS ACTION, AND IS BARRED BY LAW FROM 
ASSERTING ANY OBJECTION THERETO. 
The lower Court's decision was based exclusively on its finding that, as a matter of 
law, defendant/appellant had failed to demonstrate the existence of a binding settlement 
agreement between the parties (this position is addressed at Points II and III, below). N o 
attempt was made to address defendant/appellee's failure to particularize any objection to 
defendant/appellant's August, 1992 tender of $7,500.00 in full settlement of plain tiff/appellee's 
claim, despite the fact that this issue was fully addressed in defendant/appellant's moving papers. 
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Likewise on appeal, plaintiff/appellee has offered no valid explanation why, having 
admittedly received a tender of $7,500.00 in settlement of this matter, it failed in its obligation 
(imposed by statute in both Utah and California) to make a timely and particularize objection 
thereto. The law in this respect is clear, and must either be disregarded or enforced in this 
instance. As more fully discussed in defendant/appellant's opening brief, a valid tender was 
made and no response was forthcoming. Under these circumstances, without anything more, 
the lower Court's ruling must be reversed. 
Plaintiff/appellee has attempted to characterize defendant/appellant's tender as 
"conditional", citing Seiverts v. White. 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P.2d 974 (1954), and Kelly v. 
Leucadia Financial Corporation. 846 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1982). The Court is again referred to the 
operative documents in response to this argument. On August 5, 1992, and again on August 26, 
1992 (the latter of which plaintiff/appellee acknowledges receiving), defendant/appellant made 
an unconditional offer of $7,500.00 in satisfaction of plaintiff/appellee's claim. The only 
"condition" imposed was that the obligation be deemed satisfied thereby. If such a "condition" 
is regarded as defeating the validity of a tender, the statute is completely eviscerated—every 
tender of money carries with it the implied condition that its acceptance will satisfy the 
underlying obligation. Neither Seiverts nor Kelly suggests anything to the contrary.1 
1
 Neither the Seiverts nor the Kelly decision addresses directly the obligations imposed by 
the statutes here under consideration upon receipt of a tender. Instead, these cases concern 
themselves whether tenders of payment have been timely and properly made under real estate 
contracts, so as to give rise to an equitable interest in the property and entitle the offerors to 
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Plaintiff/appellee also argues that defendant/appellant's tender was "untimely," again 
relying on Seiverts and also on Zions Properties. Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (1975). Again, 
the cited decisions do not interpret the propriety of a tender for purposes of 78-27-3, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended). The Zions Properties decision dealt with whether the assignee 
under a real estate contract had made a timely performance in order to avoid forfeiture of the 
property covered by the contract. Since two of the tenders in question had been made after the 
deadline imposed by the contract, the court concluded, forfeiture had already occurred, and the 
plaintiff had no further rights in the real property. As noted above, the Seiverts decision dealt 
specific performance. 
The court's main concern in Seiverts was the fact that at the time tender was made, 
the offeror had not sufficient funds in its checking account to back up the tender. The court 
properly observed that, under these circumstances, there had been no effective tender; that being 
the case, no specific performance would lie. 
The Kelly decision also addressed the question of whether a tender had been timely 
and adequate to support a claim for specific performance. In its ruling, the court stated that 
"the tender cannot impose on the other party a new condition or 
requirement not already impose by the contract, [citation omitted] If the 
law were otherwise, one could use a tender to compel the other party to 
comply with new contractual terms. Accordingly, a tender, as a general 
rule must be unconditional. A tender that contains an improper condition 
or requirements disqualifies a party from attaining a degree of specific 
performance." 846 P.2d at p. 1243 (emphasis added). 
No question of specific performance is involved in this action; accordingly, the 
Seiverts and Kelly decisions are inapplicable. 
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with similar questions, concluding that since tender performance had been inadequate, the 
tenderer was not entitled to specific performance and conveyance of the real property. This case 
does not involve an advance of real property, nor defendant/appellant's entitlement to maintain 
an action for specific performance compelling the same. The question before this court arises 
strictly under the cited statutes: whether plaintiff/appellee was entitled to disregard a good-faith, 
unconditional tender of payment in satisfaction of an existing obligation.2 If plaintiff/appellee 
has reasons why defendant/appellant's tender of the very sum which it had itself twice proposed 
was insufficient, it was statutorily obligated to furnish a particularization of the perceived 
insufficiency. Absent objection, the tender should be regarded as binding. To hold otherwise 
would be to read into the statute exceptions, conditions and qualifications which the legislature 
did not see fit to include. 
POINT II 
A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED WHETHER 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE MADE A VALID OFFER, WHICH 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT TIMELY ACCEPTED. 
At pages 12-13 of its brief, plaintiff/appellee argues that, as a matter of law, it did not 
make an offer to settle this matter for $7,500.00. Yet, plaintiff/appellee has acknowledged that 
2
 Plaintiff/appellee again suggests that, for some unspecified reason, defendant/appellant's 
tender "was made in good faith" (Opposing Brief at p. 18). As with its accusation of fraudulent 
misrepresentation, plaintiff/appellee offers no explanation why defendant/appellant's tender of 
$7,500.00, based on funds then in counsel's trust account, was not "made in good faith." This 
court should not countenance such tactics. 
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it twice advanced that amount as an appropriate settlement figure in this matter. It now attempts 
to argue, though, that Michael Klein's May 18, 1992 letter was deliberately worded so as not 
to make an offer, but rather than to trick defendant into tendering the suggested amount, which 
it would then be at liberty to refuse. 
Under the very authority relied in plaintiff/appellee's opposing brief, whether a 
proposal constitutes a binding offer is to be ascertained from a totality of the circumstances-not 
the technical use of magic words. See Restatement Second, Contracts (1980 Edition), at 
§§ 2, 4. Plaintiff/appellee acknowledges that a repeatedly suggested $7,500.00 in settlement of 
this matter; plainly a fact question exists whether it made a settlement offer or not. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE NEVER WITHDREW ITS SETTLEMENT 
PROPOSAL. 
At pages 14-16 of its brief, plaintiff/appellee argues that, even if it did make a valid 
offer to settle its claim against defendant/appellant for $7,500.00, that offer was withdrawn by 
Michael Klein's counsel. 
The letter in question, attached as Exhibit 1 to plaintiff/appellee's brief, should be 
reviewed in full in this regard. Essentially, it is a tirade against defendant/appellant's counsel 
for having objected to Mr. Klein's contact with Arthur Greenburg in an attempt to enlist his 
insistence in forcing defendant/appellant to pay a disputed bill. Yet nowhere does the letter 
include any express language concerning any outstanding offer, of the withdrawal thereof. That 
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withdrawal of the outstanding offer to settle for $7,500.00 was not clearly communicated is 
further established by the subsequent course of conduct by the parties. Defendant/appellant 
plainly did not understand that the offer to settle for $7,500.00 was "off the table." Had such 
been the understanding, no subsequent acceptance thereof would have been communicated. 
Plainly, whether plaintiff/appellee effectively withdrew its offer of settlement is a 
question of fact under the circumstances. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE'S FAILURE TO RESPOND TO 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S SETTLEMENT TENDER SHOULD BE 
DEEMED AN ACCEPTANCE. 
Plaintiff/appellee argues that, if defendant/appellant's August 5 and August 25, 1992 
tenders of $7,500.00 are treated as offers, rather than acceptances of plaintiff/appellee's offer, 
plaintiff/appellee's silence in the face thereof should not be deemed an acceptance. Only where 
negotiating parties have established a "business relationship," argues plaintiff, may silence be 
deemed an acceptance (opposing brief at pp. 16-18). 
The correspondence history now urged by both parties to this matter clearly establish 
exactly such a relationship. In each instance where a proposal was tendered, a response was 
forthcoming thereto within one week. Yet, plaintiff/appellee now maintains that its lengthy 
silence in the face of repeated tenders of $7,500.00 in full settlement-plaintiff/appellee's own 
figure, twice urged-communicated no assent thereto. The argument is completely contrary to 
common sense. 
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At the very least, the lower court erred in assuming that, based on the record before 
it, no fact question existed whether-in light of the parties' course of conduct-a fact question 
existed whether plaintiff/appellee's total silence in the face of an unconditional offer to tender 
its own suggested settlement amount constituted an acceptance thereof. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE'S SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO DENY THE 
EXISTENCE OF ITS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
Relying on Triple I Supply. Inc. v. Sunset Rail. Inc.. 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982), 
plaintiff/appellee argues that it should not be estopped to deny the existence of its settlement 
agreement, since it made no effective communication upon which defendant/appellant could rely. 
The court is invited to review the correspondence submitted both the lower court and 
incident to this appeal. Plaintiff/appellee most certainly did communicate-not once, but twice-
its inclination to settle this matter for $7,500.00. The June 22 letter upon which 
plaintiff/appellee relied so heavily is complete ambiguous concerning the status of its offer in 
this regard. 
There is no ambiguity, however, in the fact that, at least by August 26, 1992, 
plaintiff/appellee was well aware that defendant/appellant understood the $7,500.00 settlement 
figure to be still valid, and that defendant/appellant believed itself to have accepted that amount. 
Yet, plaintiff/appellee deliberately made no response whatever prior to retaining local counsel 
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and filing the instant lawsuit. Under these circumstances, a clear fact question is presented 
whether an estoppel should apply. 
Plaintiff/appellee again relies upon its unsubstantiated and false claim that 
defendant/appellant somehow proceeded in bad faith by deliberately misrepresenting facts 
incident to the parties/ settlement discussions. Continuing reliance upon this position without 
any evidence calls plaintiff/appellee's own good faith into question. If plaintiff/appellee 
maintains that it was lied to, it is incumbent upon it to come forward with some reliable 
evidence to establish that fact. 
POINT VI 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER COSTS 
AND FEES INCIDENT TO THIS APPEAL. 
As the last point of its responsive brief, plaintiff/appellee has sought the recovery of 
damages, including costs and fees, under Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Plaintiff/appellee has been told continually since the inception of this matter that it is 
not entitled to the recovery of attorneys' fees. The initial judgment entered by the Municipal 
Court of Los Angeles (Exhibit 1 to defendant/appellant's opening brief, R.0029) expressly 
excluded any award of attorneys' fees. Upon entry of the lower court's ruling denying 
defendant/appellant's motion to enforce the settlement agreement, plaintiff/appellees immediately 
submitted a proposed order including a full award of costs and attorneys' fees, which the court 
promptly rejected upon defendant/appellant's objection (R. 0274). Now, incident to this appeal, 
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plaintiff/appellee again attempts to impose upon defendant/appellant its own costs in avoiding 
the settlement agreement which it itself proposed in this matter. This it seeks to accomplish by 
labeling this appeal as "frivolous." 
The argument is worthy of little response. The court is invited to review the totality 
of the circumstances in this matter, and determine for itself whether defendant/appellant's appeal 
is frivolous. Defendant/appellant, acting in good faith and under the belief that an agreement 
had been reached, both accepted and tendered plaintiff/appellee's own settlement figure. Under 
both statutory and common law, defendant/appellant has, at the very least, the right to a full 
evidentiary hearing concerning whether, under the facts of this case, it must be compelled to pay 
more than plaintiff/appellee requested. On their face, the facts are distinct by many orders of 
magnitude from the decision relied upon in plaintiff/appellee's brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, and upon defendant/appellant's opening brief, it is submitted 
that the lower court's decision denying defendant/appellant's motion for release from judgment, 
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and to enforce settlement agreement, must be reversed, and the agreement either enforced by 
order of this court or the matter remanded for further proceedings below. 
DATED this ^ day of June, 1993. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
/ 
By <^-*? >^\ 
Vinc^gi^€^*Smpton 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
- w s 
I hereby certify that on the S day of June, 1993,1 caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, to the 
following: 
James W. Kennicott 
1647 Shortline Road, Suite 200 
Post Office Box 2339 
Park City, Utah 84060 
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Tabl 
K L E I N & S T E I N 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
y C « » t *>. «TCIN SUITE 3QtO TCtC*«ONC 
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tOCO CCNTUMV M M N CAST 
LOS ANOCLCS. CALIFORNIA 9 0 0 6 7 
Or eouNtCi. 
OlCMARO A. WClSZ 
February 11, 1907 
Mr. Peter Arnold 
6321 Rocking Horse Way 
Orange, California 92669 
Re: Riverside Shopping Center 
For legal services rendered in connection with the above 
captioned matter for the month of January, 1987 and through 
February 11, 1987, including telephone conferences with Carone, 
client, Reiss, opposing counsel, Bobker, Arthur Greenberg, 
accountant, Parasec; order UCC filings and LP-l; review documents 
and prepare memos and correspondence; review draft agreement; 
prepare draft agreement; review leases and prepare lease summary: 
research; review of files; conference at Bobker»s office* 
conference at Klein & stein; miscellaneous correspondence, all on 
S J ^ S a ? 1 S ; S f VJCGf r e n d e r e d on January 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, February 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 1987. 
42 hours at $185 per hour $ 7
 7 7 0 
Costs incurred, including copies, 
stamps, long distance postage, 
UCC search and Parasec fees, paralegal 
and overtime secretary
 4 S 0 
T o t a l
 $ 8,220 
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Tab 2 
Vincent C. Rampton (USB #2684) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KLEIN & STEIN, Attorneys at Law, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PETER J. ARNOLD, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PETER J. ARNOLD 
Civil No. 92-11615 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
PETER J. ARNOLD, having been first duly sworn and upon oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am currently a resident of Summit County, State of Utah, and am 
die named defendant in the above-entitled action. 
11777.1 
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2. In January of 1987, I retained the law firm of Klein & Stein to 
assist in the purchase of a leasehold interest in a shopping center located in Riverside, 
California, my regular counsel (Arthur Greenberg) having a conflict of interest. 
3. Mr. Michael S. Klein of Klein & Stein reviewed six existing 
documents relating to the property in question, wrote me on five-page memorandum 
analyzing his review, and drafted a purchase and sale agreement. 
4. In my experience as a real estate developer, and in working with 
Arthur Greenberg, I was of the impression that the amount of work performed by Mr. Stein 
should amount to no more than ten hours' billable time. 
5. On February 11, 1987, I received a bill from Klein & Stein in the 
amount of $8,220.00, which included 42 hours of attorney time at $185.00 per hour. I 
viewed this at the time, and continue to view it, as plainly excessive given the amount of 
work performed. 
6. I have reviewed Michael S. Klein's Affidavit of October 5, 1992 in 
this matter. I have no recollection of any of the following matters claimed therein by Mr. 
Klein: 
a. That I never complained about the size of Klein & Stein's 
bill-to the contrary, during personal meetings and telephone conversations, I repeatedly 
expressed to Mr. Klein that I was troubled by the size of the bill; 
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b. That I ever advised Mr. Klein that I had mailed a check in 
full payment to him; 
c. That I committed at any time to visit Mr. Klein's office in 
person and pay the bill in full; 
d. That I received Mr. Klein's letter of September 1, 1987, 
attached as Exhibit B to his Affidavit (I have no knowledge whether that letter was sent or 
not; however, I have no recollection of receiving or reading it). 
7. When I was served with process by Klein and Stein in its attempt to 
collect its bill, I was in no position financially to make any payment thereon, or to challenge 
Klein & Stein in court. At that time, I had numerous creditors making demands on me, and 
could not afford the attorneys fees to resist the lawsuit. I therefore permitted default 
judgment to be entered against me. 
8. Mr. Klein was well aware, at the time he obtained judgment against 
me, that I disputed the amount of his bill and considered it excessive. 
DATED this day of October, 1992. 
PETER J. ARNOLD 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this day of October, 
1992. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
0163 
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LAW OFFICES OF 
GREENBERG, GLUSKER, FIELDS, CLAMAN & MACHTINGER 
1900 AVENUE OF THE STARS 
• u r r c 2000 
LOS ANOELCS. CALIFORNIA 90067 
TELEPHONE: (310) 553-3610 
WAX: (210) 551-0687 
October 15, 1992 
OUR FILE NUM9ER: 
99910-000.00 
Vincent C. Rampton, Esq. 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Michael S. Klein 
Dear Mr. Rampton: 
The following are my comments to paragraphs 14 and 22-28 of 
Michael Klein's declaration. 
Paragraph 14: I believe that I first became aware of the 
fact that Mr. Klein claimed that Mr. Arnold owed him money when I 
contacted Mr. Klein to obtain a declaration in connection with 
litigation between the owner of the ground of a Riverside 
shopping center and a former ground lessee. I never informed Mr. 
Klein that I f,was representing parties against Mr. Arnold in an 
action arising from the sale of the shopping center". Mr. Arnold 
was never a party to that litigation. I did inform Mr. Klein 
that because Mr. Arnold was a former client of my firm, I would 
be unable to give Mr. Arnold's address to Mr. Klein. 
Paragraph 22: No comment. 
Paragraph 23: I did tell Mr. Klein that Mr. Arnold was 
again a client of my firm and that I would not be able to give 
Mr. Arnold's address to Mr. Klein. I told Mr. Klein that I would 
send to Mr. Arnold any correspondence which Mr. Klein wanted me 
to forward to Mr. Arnold. I did not offer "to attempt to assist 
in collection,f. I did not discuss with Mr. Klein the nature of 
our legal services for Mr. Arnold. I was not Hwell aware of the 
situation and the fact that Mr. Klein had not been paid by Mr. 
Arnold11. Mr. Klein informed me that he had not been paid. 
Paragraph 24: I did receive the Exhibit "I" letters. I 
believe I asked my partner, Bill Halama, to forward copies of 
those letters to Mr. Arnold. 
Paragraph 25: I did receive a copy of Exhibit "K".
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ARTHUR N,GREENBERG 
DIRECT DIAL NUMBER 
C310) 201-7402 
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CLAMAN & MACHTINGER 
Vincent C. Rampton, Esq. 
October 15, 1992 
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Paragraph 26: No comment. 
Paragraph 27: No comment. 
Paragraph 28: I never told Mr. Klein that Mr. Arnold was 
paying our law firm. 
If you have any questions, please let me know. 
Si/hce] jA rely, 
Arthur N. Greenberg 
ANG:llw 
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